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ABSTRACT
Packet classification is one of the fundamental building blocks
of various security primitives and thus it needs to be highly effi-
cient and available. In this paper, we evaluate whether the de facto
packet classification algorithm (i.e., Tuple Space Search scheme,
TSS) used in many popular software networking stacks, e.g., Open
vSwitch, VPP, HyperSwitch, is robust against low-rate denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks. We present the Tuple Space Explosion (TSE)
attack that exploits the fundamental space/time complexity of the
TSS algorithm. We demonstrate that the TSE attack can degrade the
switch performance to as low as 12% of its full capacity with a very
low packet rate (i.e., 0.7Mbps) when the target packet classification
only has simple policies, e.g., “allow a few flows but drop all others”.
Then, we show that if the adversary has partial knowledge of the
installed classification policies, she can virtually bring down the
packet classifier with the same low attack rate. The TSE attack, in
general, does not generate any specific attack traffic patterns but
some attack packets with randomly chosen IP headers and arbitrary
message contents. This makes it particularly hard to build a signa-
ture of our attack traffic for detection. Since the TSE attack exploits
the fundamental complexity characteristics of the TSS algorithm,
unfortunately, there seems to be no complete mitigation of the prob-
lem. We thus suggest, as a long-term solution, to use other packet
classification algorithms (e.g., hierarchical tries, HaRP, Hypercuts)
that are not vulnerable to the TSE attack. As a short-term solution,
we propose MFCGuard, a monitoring system that carefully manages
the entries in the tuple space to keep packet classification fast for
the packets that are eventually accepted by the system.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Denial-of-service attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Packet classification is one of the fundamental building blocks of
various security primitives. From access control implementation to
network traffic isolation to denial-of-service defenses, they all re-
quire to classify incoming packets into multiple groups for different
purposes, e.g., block/redirect certain traffic. Packet classification,
thus, should be highly efficient, dependable, and available.
With the proliferation of virtualization techniques, packet classi-
fication has become softwarized and been widely used in virtualized
systems today. As an example, Open vSwitch (OVS) [57] (along with
many other software switches; e.g., VPP [26], HyperSwitch [59],
GSwitch [76]) is universally used in virtualized environments. OVS
is massively used for basic switching and firewall implementation
for the tenants in cloud hosting systems enabling them to further
specify custom firewall rules for their own purposes [15, 70] (§2).
Moreover, dynamic filter rule updates for denial-of-service defense
can be implemented with the software-defined networking (SDN)
capability [8], particularly OpenFlow, in OVS [45].
In this paper, we evaluate whether the de facto packet classifi-
cation algorithm widely used in many popular software switches
(OVS as our running example) is robust against denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks (§3). Our study has great importance since the targeted
packet classification algorithm, namely, Tuple Space Search scheme
(TSS) [64], is extensively used not only in traditional appliances but
also in wide range of virtualized networked systems; just to name a
few, software based intrusion detection systems [43], stateful NAT
implementation [33, 48], cloud management systems [25, 71].
Our findings are alarming. Not only effective DoS attacks against
the TSS packet classification are possible but also detection and
mitigation of the attacks are hard. First, we present a new low-
rate DoS attack, which we call the Tuple Space Explosion (TSE)
attack (§3), against the TSS scheme (§4). We demonstrate that as lit-
tle as 670 kbps of attack traffic from a single traffic source can easily
degrade a single OVS instance from its full capacity of 10 Gbps to
2Mbps when an adversary has a partial control over (or knowledge
of) the access control rules installed in the targeted OVS (§5).When
an adversary has no such access to her target (§6), we show, she can
still achieve a significant degradation of 88% from the maximum
capacity with low attack traffic volume.
One interesting aspect of the TSE attack is that it does not
demonstrate any specific patterns of its attack traffic. Unlike the
existing low-rate DoS attacks (e.g., algorithmic-complexity DoS
attacks [16, 61], shrew attacks [42]) that send carefully-crafted at-
tack packet sequences with specific traffic patterns to the target
system, the TSE attack only requires arbitrary packet header fields
and message contents, along with arbitrary packet arrival times.
This makes its identification hard as it is not straightforward to
define a specific signature of the attack traffic.
In fact that the TSE attack is highly effective only with randomly-
generated inputs implies that the attack does not depend on specific
attack strategies. Instead, it relies on the internal state of the target
switch. That is, there exist certain states of the target switch that
makes it vulnerable to DoS attacks with randomly-generated in-
puts. We investigate such system states in terms of Access Control
Lists (ACLs) of the TSS packet classification. Unfortunately, some
commonly used ACL patterns (e.g., WhiteList+DefaultDeny) are
shown to be particularly vulnerable to the TSE attack.
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Lastly, the very fact that the target of the TSE attack is the packet
classifier itself makes it hard to design countermeasures. Defend-
ing against the TSE attack would require to have another packet
classifier to filter out suspicious packets. However, unfortunately,
the additional packet classifier is also likely vulnerable to the same
DoS attack if implemented with the TSS algorithm. To mitigate the
TSE DoS attack, thus, one has to deploy a different packet classifier
that is robust against the TSE attacks. Yet, this suggests that this
second packet classifier could have been simply used as the main
classifier in the first place!
The TSE attack exploits the fundamental space/time complex-
ity of the TSS algorithm and thus no complete mitigation of the
problem seems possible (§7). Therefore, as a long-term solution,
we suggest to use other packet classification algorithms that are
not vulnerable to the TSE attack. Hierarchical tries [31], HaRP [58],
and Hypercuts [10] packet classification algorithms seem to be un-
affected by the TSE attack directly, although more in-depth study
may be required for comprehensive analysis.
As a short-term solution, we present a cache management
scheme, which we call MFCGuard, that dynamically monitors the
number of entries in the tuple space and removes less important
ones to lower the performance overhead of the packet classification
(§8). We show that MFCGuard can limit the performance degradation
for the packets that are eventually allowed to the system. This guar-
anteed performance for the allowed packets is achieved, however, at
the expense of much increased processing time for the packets to be
denied by the ACL rules. We discuss some operational concerns of
MFCGuard, particularly when used in cloud hosting systems, where
the increased computation overhead of MFCGuard may affect the
operation of the tenants’ workloads in the system.
2 BACKGROUND
Here, we describe the operation and fundamental building blocks
of the most typical virtual switches, particularly, Open vSwitch
(OVS) [57], and present the packet classification, called Tuple Space
Search (TSS), used in OVS. Readers familiar with the packet classi-
fication algorithms in software switches may continue from §3.
2.1 Switching Stacks for Virtualization
Enterprises increasingly offload business-critical workloads to the
public cloud to benefit from low infrastructure costs, high availabil-
ity, and flexible resource provisioning. Reliable and efficient service
provisioning heavily depends on the ability to efficiently switch
traffic between the tenants’ workloads and the outside world.
In this paper, we use OVS as our running example, but the
presented vulnerabilities might affect other TSS-based software
switches (e.g., VPP [26], Hyperswitch [59], GSwitch [76]). OVS [57]
is an open source, multilayer, production quality software switch
that enables massive network automation through programmatic
extensions [1]. It can be managed remotely through standardized
control plane protocols [52, 56]. The OVS flow table describes the
packet processing behavior to be implemented by the switching
logic at a high level. Due to its flexibility, generality, and community
support, OVS has been extensively used in cloud deployments [1].
The flow table of an OVS switch is an ordered set of flows, where
each flow is a pair of (1) a wildcard rule, operating on specific
protocol header fields (e.g., IP source address, ports) and designating
packets that belong to the flow, and (2) an action, a set of packet
processing primitives to be applied to packets matching the flow
rule; e.g., “forward to port”, or “drop”.
Two flows in the flow table are said to overlap if there is a packet
header that matches both. In this case, thematching flow that occurs
first in the flow table takes precedence. For instance, in the sample
ACL in Fig. 6, a packet with source IP address 10.0.0.1, source
and destination ports 34521, and 443, respectively, matches both
the second and the last flow entries with the first flow overriding
the last one by higher priority.
In contrast, a flow table in which all rules are disjoint is order-
independent because all packets have a single matching rule and
equal priority (i.e., order is irrelevant). In general, this makes packet
classification much simpler [41].
Most software switches (if not all) support order-dependent flow
tables despite the performance benefit of order-independent tables
because of the flexibility of the former. In virtualized environments
(e.g., multiple tenants share a single software switch for access
control), users with various networking knowledge configure the
flow rules in the switches. The greater flexibility of order-dependent
tables support rule wildcarding and flow priorities, which allow
complex packet processing logics to be described concisely.
2.2 TSS for Fast Packet Classification
To cut down the prohibitive cost of packet classification, OVS adopts
the well-known fast path/slow path separation principle [50]. The
fast path comprises two layers of flow caches, and the slow path
implements a complete representation of the flow table serving as
a fallback when the fast path cannot decide on the fate of a packet.
Only the first packet of each flow is subjected to full-blown flow-
table processing, i.e., slow path, and the resulting flow-specific rules
and actions are then registered in the flow caches; the rest of the
flow’s packets take the fast path. This amortizes the cost of packet
classification over subsequent packets of a flow, contributing to
increased performance without loss of expressiveness and general-
ity [13, 39, 46] (cf. §11.1 for the general flow-cache hierarchy).
Within the fast path, the microflow cache implements a per-
transport-connection exact-match store where lookup occurs over
all header fields, while the megaflow cache (MFC) bundles multiple
microflows into a single megaflow to impose common processing
to the entire bundle [29, 48, 63]. In this design, the microflow cache
merely serves as “short-term” memory and it is often exhausted
even in normal operation (by default, it contains only a couple of
hundred entries). The lookup algorithm in the MFC relies on the
TSS scheme [64], the prevailing packet classifier used to implement
ACLs in other hypervisor switches as well (e.g., VPP [26], Hyper-
Switch [59], GSwitch [76]). MFC generally saves on cache entries
by a single megaflow covering, say, all incoming HTTP connections
regardless of the source TCP port (i.e., TCP port wildcarded). In
a nutshell, this is done by collecting the entries matching on the
same set of header bits into a hash in which masked packet headers
can be found fast. Then, masks and associated hashes are searched
sequentially until the first matching entry is found.
Note that the TSS implementation in OVS does not know about
flow priorities; thus the slow path ensures that MFC entries are
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all disjoint to make packet classification simpler yet introducing
worst case exponential complexity (i.e., exhaustive linear search
in the different masks). Correspondingly, as long as the number
of masks is kept in a reasonable range (e.g., couple of hundreds
masks), packet processing in the fast path is close to line rate. This
property of the TSS is the very logic we aim to exploit in this paper.
3 TUPLE SPACE EXPLOSION: OVERVIEW
Here, we provide a high-level overview of the attack. First, we
describe our threatmodel, thenwe show the essence of the proposed
TSE attack and discuss the algorithmic complexity vulnerability of
the TSS scheme using its implementation in OVS. Then, we show
two different approaches of TSE, each posing different requirements
and targets for the attacker.
3.1 Threat Model
We consider a general virtualized computing environment, where
a targeted software switch is used for packet processing and basic
network operations. This includes a typical multi-tenant cloud in-
frastructure whereby tenants lease resources in the cloud to deliver
public services. Tenants may use cloud management system (CMS)
APIs to set up their access-control list (ACL) rules in the underlying
software switch to access-control, redirect, or log accesses to differ-
ent resources [15, 35–37]. We consider that the internal algorithms
of the data plane fabric is fully known to adversaries.
The attacker’s goal is to send some attack packets to the virtual
switch, which when subjected to the implemented ACL will exhaust
the underlying resources denying access to the rest of the users.
The adversary only needs to have the capability of crafting and
sending IP packets with arbitrary legitimate headers without being
filtered at the first hand; e.g., by her upstream or transit ISPs.
Note that we do not require any privilege of the target switch
for the effective DoS attack. However, having some partial, internal
state of the target switch (e.g., installed ACL rules) can further
improve the efficiency (i.e., less number of required attack packets).
Here, we do not consider volumetric DoS attacks that congest
the target‘s network bandwidth with attack traffic.
3.2 DoS with Excessive MFC Masks
As mentioned in §2.2, the lesser the number of masks in the MFC
the much faster the packet classification is.
To provide a simple but useful intuition oh how easily this num-
ber can be increased, consider that in a hypothetical protocol (say,
HYP) having only 3 relevant header bits and consider a 3-bit-wide
“Whitelist+DefaultDeny” type flow table shown in Fig. 1. The MFC
is an unordered set of key-mask pairs C = {(K,M)} with entries
C = (K,M); here,M is a bitmap to mask relevant header bits and K
is a key to be matched on the masked bits. According to the TSS
scheme, we maintain a list of distinct masksM (the “tuple space”)
plus, for each maskM ∈ M, a hash HM that will be used to store
and lookup the keys with maskM .
Suppose that the switch receives a packet with HYP header
h1 = 001. Since, initially, the MFC is empty, the packet is deferred
to the slow path, which finds the first flow in the flow table to
match, associates the action allow, and installs a new key-mask
pair C1 = (001, 111) into the MFC; this amounts to adding the
new mask 111 to the mask listM and storing the key 001 in the
respective hash H111.
Now assume that a second packet arrives with header h2 = 111.
In this case, MFC lookup occurs as follows: take each mask M ∈
M one by one, apply M to the header and look up the resulting
bitvector in the corresponding hash HM ; if the lookup succeeds,
then return a cache hit; otherwise resort to the next mask. In this
case, there is only a single mask M = 111, so we look up the key
(h2 AND M) = 111 in H111. Since the lookup fails, this is a cache
miss. The slow path will find the drop rule to match, and it will
insert a new MFC entry into the fast path.
At this point, there are multiple choices to generate a new en-
try, each striking a different balance between space- and time-
complexity (see details in §4); which one is taken in any particular
case is the result of a rather involved construction of heuristics in
the OVS slow path [57]. In a nutshell, when generating a new MFC
entry C for a packet with header h, OVS maintains the following
two invariants:
Inv(1) Cover: h matches C .
Inv(2) Independence: C is disjoint from any C ′ ∈ C.
Inv(1) simply states that an MFC entry will match the packet
header that sparked its generation. Inv(2) greatly simplifies the
fast path code because lookup can early-exit once the first match
is found, instead of having to tediously search through the entire
mask list to check whether higher-priority matches occur later in
the list (cf. Alg. 1 in §11.2). Hence, h2 = 111 can spawn a new key-
mask pair of either C2 = (111, 111) or C2 = (111, 100), covering 1
or 4 packets, respectively, according to different strategies (cf §4.1).
One might realize that due to these invariants, the number of
key-mask pairs covering all possible packets significantly increases
with the number and bit-width of the headers the ACL matches on.
Particularly, if we establish a logical OR relation between the allow
rules on more header fields (see a typical example in Fig. 6), it will
in turn create an AND connection on the drop rule. Therefore, in
order to test each header field at the same time, we need to test each
combination of key-mask pairs for the individual headers resulting
in a multiplicative increase in the tuple space (cf. §4.2).
This means that a typical ACL matching on the IP source address
and TCP ports (e.g., ACL in Fig 6) can easily result in thousands of
MFC masks. Consequently, this type of security policies/ACLs with
an OR relation between the targeted header fields can become the
sweet-spot for our attack; hence the name Tuple Space Explosion.
Next, we briefly present two different approaches of the TSE
attack based on the partial control an adversary can have over the
ACL. Then, in §4, we give a comprehensive overview of the look up
algorithm, analyze its space- and time-complexity as the number
of headers grows, and go through each case step-by-step to show
how the MFC is exactly being managed.
3.3 Two Approaches of the TSE Attack
Before, we have seen that in order to practically populate the MFC
with new entries and masks, we need to send a specially crafted
packet sequence corresponding to the installed ACL. For instance,
sending packets with (HYP) header {001} and {100} towards to
the ACL shown in Fig. 1 will spawn entries #1 and #2 in the MFC
as depicted in Fig. 3. However, a subsequent packet with header
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{101} will be also “caught by” entry #2, hence not increasing the
number of masks in the MFC. Correspondingly, being aware of the
ACL itself is a key aspect to the efficiency of the TSE attack. Thus,
we present two different approaches of the TSE attack each posing
different requirements and targets for the attacker.
In order to explain the main differences between them, and their
practical targets, we need to understand a key abstraction in a
cloud environment: the per-user virtual switches tenants configure
to set up their ACLs. Tenants perceive these virtualised resources
as their own physical switch, however switches are only logically
separated and all of them are implemented and managed by the
same individual software switch instance. Therefore, all workloads
happened to be scheduled to the same hypervisor inherently share
the switching fabric as well (e.g., the MFC).
Co-located TSE. We build on top of this abstraction: the attacker
has leased resources in the cloud, which inherently makes him/her
capable of installing ACLs into its own virtual switch. Then, the
shared MFC can be easily populated with new masks by targeting
the known ACLs (see details in §5). However, co-location comes at a
price that only those tenants’ workloads are affected that happened
to be scheduled to the same hypervisor.
General TSE. In this approach, we alleviate the restrictions of
Co-located TSE: we consider the case when the attacker has neither
resources in the cloud, nor knowledge about any ACLs. Here, we
investigate how much more effort an attacker needs in order to
achieve the same efficiency as Co-located TSE (see later in §6).
4 SPACE – TIME COMPLEXITY OF TSS
Next, we analyze the space- and time-complexity trade-offs of the
TSS scheme using its implementation in OVS as a typical example.
Then, we show how the TSS scheme manages its data structure, and
how to maximize the number of masks in the MFC step-by-step.
Clearly, the most time-consuming step in Alg. 1 is the iteration
through the mask listM, assuming that a hash lookup in HM is
O(1); the more the masks the slower the algorithm. The space-
complexity is in turn driven by the sheer storage size of the MFC
entries. Our observations are as follows.
Observation 1. The time-complexity of TSS lookup grows lin-
early with the number of distinct masks as O(|M|) and the space-
complexity grows linearly with the number of entries as O(|C|).
Next, we demonstrate that the complexity of cache lookup can
become prohibitive due to an algorithmic complexity vulnerability
in the underlying TSS scheme. In particular, we show specific corner
cases for which the MFC will exhibit exponential space- and/or
time-complexity. For simplicity, we carry on with the hypothetical
3-bit protocol example (cf. Table 1), but bear in mind that MFC
works the same for arbitrary wide bit-widths of header fields.
4.1 Maximize MFC Masks: Single Header
Packet classification is conceptually easier when there is only a
single packet header field, e.g., IP protocol or destination address in
the flow rules [30, 63]. First, we concentrate on this case, i.e., when
the network policies match on a single header field only. Consider
again the simplified policy on 3 bits mentioned in §3.2, i.e., when
packets with header HYP 001 is allowed and everything else is
Wildcard rule Action
0 0 1 allow
* * * deny
Figure 1: Sample flow table
# Key Mask Action
#1 000 111 deny
#2 001 111 allow
#3 010 111 deny
. . . . . . . . . deny
#8 111 111 deny
Figure 2: Exact-match
# Key Mask Action
#1 001 111 allow
#2 100 100 deny
#3 010 110 deny
#4 000 111 deny
Figure 3: Wildcarding
denied. Next, we discuss some possible strategies to construct the
MFC for this ACL using TSS.
An invalid strategy would be to install the flow table as is into
the MFC resulting in two masks and two MFC entries. However,
this would violate the independence invariant as the two entries
overlap: a packet with HYP 001 would match both MFC entries,
which would confuse the lookup algorithm. Consequently, in order
to load a flow table into the MFC, it first needs to be converted into
an order-independent form.
Exact-match strategy. One trivial order-independent transformation
would be to cover the entire range of HYP with a single completely
filled exact-matching hash, resulting in the TSS setup depicted in
Fig. 2. Since we have a single mask, TSS lookup is extremely fast
(cf. Observation 1). However, we need to add all possible 8 keys
that can occur on 3 bits to the hash, yielding a larger memory
footprint. Note that in general, the exact-match technique yields
optimal time-complexity with exponential space-complexity.
Wildcarding strategy. The opposite extreme would be to wildcard as
many bits as possible in order to get the broadest possible rules, and
the fewest hashes, in TSS. Here, we obtain an exact-match entry
for the allow-rule and separate key-mask pairs for testing each of
the related 3 header bits to cover the whole tuple space. First, check
whether the most significant bit is set and, if it is, then drop the
packet; then, test for the second bit provided that the first bit is not
set, and so on. One can easily check in Fig. 3 that the resulting MFC
is order-independent and it is the smallest possible representation
of this kind. We obtain 4 entries and 3 masks (the first and the last
entries have the same mask), reducing the space complexity from
8 megaflows to just 4 at the cost of increasing classification time
from a single iteration of the TSS lookup algorithm (Algorithm 1) to
possibly 3 iterations for the 3masks. Apparently, each strategy gives
a different compromise between space- and time-complexity (in
line with [27, 32]). The below theorem characterizes the attainable
tradeoffs in general TSS (see proof in the Appendix).
Theorem 4.1. Given an ACL on aw-bit header field comprising
a single exact-match allow rule and a lower-priority DefaultDeny
policy, no TSS construction can achieve better than O(k) time with
O(k2wk ) space complexity, for 1 ≤ k ≤ w .
Here, the parameter k balances between time- and space-
complexity: for k = 1, we get optimal time-complexity (O(1) time
with O(2w ) space), for k = w we get optimal space-complexity
(O(w) time with O(w) space), and different settings for 1 ≤ k ≤ w
give different tradeoffs. While the compromise a particular TSS
implementation realizes in a setup depends on a lot of unknowns,
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HYP HYP2 action
001 * allow
* 1111 allow
* * deny
Figure 4: ACL on 2 headers
# HYP HYP2 Action
#1 001 **** allow
#2 1** 1111 allow
#3 01* 1111 allow
#4 000 1111 allow
#5 1** 0*** deny
#6 01* 0*** deny
#7 000 0*** deny
... ... ... deny
#14 1** 1110 deny
#15 01* 1110 deny
#16 000 1110 deny
Figure 5: Corresponding
MFC (keys are masked)
in practice OVS usually leans toward the “wildcarding” strategy (k
close tow), striving to minimize the memory footprint of the fast
path classifier even at the cost of crippling lookup efficiency (see
the comments in classifier.h in the OVS source code).
In essence, this means that for a single header of bit-widthw , the
MFC will have w masks (in the worst case). However, in certain
cases, OVS seems to optimize for the other extreme and minimizes
lookup time at the cost of exponential space (k close to 1); we have
seen such behavior for ACLs including IPv6 address fields (cf. §5.4).
4.2 Maximize MFC Masks: Multi Headers
Next, we generalize the single-field technique to multiple fields to
get the desired exponential complexity in any TSS implementation.
Asmentioned before, an ACL that filters on the 32-bit IPv4 source
address field (w1 = 32), we can generate 32 masks and 33 entries.
For the port field (w2 = 16), the corresponding figures are 16masks
and 17 entries, respectively. Establishing a logical OR relation, on
the other hand, between different header fields in the ACL at the
same time will in turn create an AND connection on the drop rule.
Considering our example ACL in Fig. 4, this means that a packet
can be dropped only if both HYP is not 001 and HYP2 is not 1111.
We can see that the most space-efficient way to test the deny case
individually for the HYP field is to test each bit one by one and
similarly for HYP2 field. However, collectively testing the two fields
involves testing each combination of bit positions in the two fields
(cf. Fig. 5), yielding 3 ∗ 4 + 1 = 13 masks with roughly the same
number of entries1. Observe that the first allow rule of the ACL is
represented in the MFC in the same way, which does not apply for
the second allow rule (hence +1 in the above equation).
Theorem 4.2. Given an ACL on n header fields of bit-widthw1,
w2, . . ., wn , comprising n allow-rules, each exact-matching on a
single header field, plus a lower-priority DefaultDeny policy, no TSS
construction can achieve better than
O
(∏
i
ki
)
time-complexity and
O
(∏
i
ki
(
2
wi
ki − 1
))
space-complexity
for any 1 ≤ ki ≤ wi , i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
1Note that if the second rule (in Fig. 4) also filtered on HYP, we would still have roughly
the same masks; only allowance would change.
Here, again the formula allows to tune the space–time tradeoff,
but this time separately for each field through setting 1 ≤ ki ≤ wi .
For the extreme choice ki = 1 for all i , we again get optimal time
(O(1) time with O(2
∑
i wi ) space) and ki = wi yields optimal space
(O(∏i wi ) for both time and space), and different settings for ki
again provide different tradeoffs. In practice, we observed again
OVS to lean towards space minimization yielding the required
multiplicatively scaling O(∏i wi ) space- and time-complexity.
5 CO-LOCATED TSE
In this section, we discuss the Co-located TSE attack in detail. First
we show the basic idea behind generating an “adversarial” packet
sequence corresponding to the installed ACL. Then, we present
a typical ACL tenants usually deploy for their services, and we
apply our technique to show the efficiency of Co-located TSE. In
particular, we evaluate Co-located TSE in various synthetic and live
testbeds, and we show to what extent the tuple space explosion
phenomenon can degrade the overall performance with considering
several hardware offloading techniques.
5.1 Adversarial Packet Trace
As discussed in §3, to practically spawn the MFC entries, we need
a specially crafted packet sequence. Note that such packets are
completely legitimate and benign just as the useful user traffic.
Taking the example ACLs in §4.1 and §4.2, first we consider only a
single header, then we turn to the case of multiple headers.
Single Header. We found the following packet trace generation
strategy against the single header scenario to work well in practice:
generate a packet that matches the allow rule, then add a packet
with each of the relevant bits inverted one-by-one. In Fig. 1, this
results in the following HYP header fields: { 001, 101, 011, 000 }.
It can be seen that packets with these headers will exactly result in
the 4 MFC entries and 3 masks shown in Fig. 3.
Multiple Headers. We generalize from the single-field case to the
multi-field case with minimal modification. Consider the extended
sample ACL in Fig. 4. First, create the HYP list LHYP according to the
bit-inversion method, then create a similar list LHYP2 for the HYP2
field, and then generate a packet with setting HYP and HYP2 from
the outer product of the lists LHYP × LHYP2. Ignoring the packets
for the second allow rule that do not generate new masks (see
entries #2 − #4 and #14 − #16 in Fig. 5), this technique gives exactly
4 ∗ 3 + 1 = 13 packets and the same number of MFC masks. We
omit the formal proofs here for brevity.
5.2 Practical ACLs
The effectiveness of the attack depends on the number of MFC
masks the attacker can spawn in the data plane, which in turn
depends on the number, bit-width and the values of the header
fields the installed network policies match on. Correspondingly,
as a full-blown attack we can target 3 IP header fields out of the
possible IP 5-tuple: the source IP address, the source transport port,
and the destination port2 (see Fig. 6). Accordingly, we distinguish
between several use cases, each with its own set of targeted header
fields and its own expected effectiveness (the numbers are for IPv4).
2Non-IP packets not destined to the service will never reach the hypervisor.
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Rule id ip_src tcp_src tcp_dst action
#1 * * 80 allow
#2 10.0.0.1 * * allow
#3 * 12345 * allow
#4 * * * deny
Figure 6: Simple ACL of a full-blown TSE attack.
Table 1: HW/SW and orchestrator versions.
Property Synthetic OpenStack Kubernetes
CPU Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 2 x Intel i5-6300U
Memory 64GB 2 x 2GB
NIC Intel X710 Intel 82598 virtio
SmartNIC Mellanox CX-4 – –
Kernel 4.13.13-1 4.4.0-112 4.4
OVS 2.9.2 (stable) 2.9.90 (unstable) 2.7
Orchestrator – OpenStack Queens Kubernetes 1.7
First, in case of Baseline, there is only one allow rule (apart
from the simple DefaultDeny rule) in the flow table, which allows
the tenant’s service to be reached (e.g., rule #1 in the ACL in Fig. 6).
Accordingly, there is one benign traffic flowmatching on that single
rule only, and no malicious traffic enters the system; #MFCmasks: 1.
This scenario represents the full capacity of the switch in normal
operation and serves as a baseline to measure service degradation
for the rest of the use cases.
In case of Dp, we attack on a single header field, the 16-bit
destination port. Accordingly, the ACL contains only Rule #1 and
Rule #4 from the full-blown setup of Fig. 6, but now adversarial
traffic against rule #1 is sent; #MFC masks: 16. Then, we gradually
increase the number of headers and combine them, starting from
the basic multi-field attacks of SpDp and SipDp, targeting both port
(#MFC masks:∼ 162 = 256), and the IP source address with the
destination port fields (#MFC masks: ∼ 32 ∗ 16 = 512), respectively.
Finally, as a full-blown attack, in SipSpDp we target all rules in
Fig. 6 (#MFC masks: ∼ 8200). Note that in all cases the traffic traces
also include some additional random noise added to "unimportant"
header fields (e.g., varying TTL) to increase the entropy hence using
up the microflow cache.
5.3 Environments and Setup
Next, we present the setup used to evaluate Co-located TSE attack
in various live environments. First, we present synthetic measure-
ments on a standalone switch to show that the TSS implementation
in OVS is vulnerable to TSE attacks. We also demonstrate that even
if the TSS implementation is offloaded to the hardware, such a system
is still vulnerable. Then, we study the performance of OVS when
used as a hypervisor switch in a real OpenStack and a Kubernetes
environment (small in-house testbeds for ethical reasons). Table 1
lists the software and hardware configurations used for the tests.
In these environments, we measure the raw throughput of a
standalone OVS by simulating the pipeline that would arise in a
real cloud deployment. We created a simplified cloud infrastructure
consisting of a small data center (DC) having 2 servers hosting the
tenants’ workloads (see Fig. 7). In particular, the victim has a pub-
licly available web service (V1 in Server 1), which s/he has installed
an ACL (ACL-V) for. Furthermore, the victim also has another ser-
vice (V2) used as a backend service of V1 scheduled to Server 2.
On the other hand, the attacker also has a leased resource (A1)
co-located with V1 in Server 1. Similarly, the attacker also defines
Figure 7: Simplified cloud infrastructure model and
overview of Co-located TSE (thin dot-dashed purple line)
and General TSE (thick red dashed line) attacks.
an ACL (ACL-A) for his/her own service (again, A1). However, in
this case the attacker installs the ACL used for the full-blown TSE
attack (cf. Fig. 6), and will send a corresponding packet sequence
to it in order to populate the MFC with an excess amount of masks;
hence potentially degrading the quality of services of other tenants’
(i.e., V1 in this case). Furthermore, since the attainable number of
masks is known, measurements do not require multiple runs.
5.4 Synthetic tests
Here, similarly to [59], our simplified DC consists of a system-
under-test (SUT) which runs OVS acting as a hypervisor for two
KVM virtual machines (Server 1), connected back-to-back to a sim-
ilar “test” machine (Server 2). Instead of having a third machine
for the incoming user traffic, for brevity, we only run an iperf3
session between V1 and V2 (cf. Fig. 7). This represents the “useful”
benign traffic (e.g., frontend – backend communication), whose
performance degradation will demonstrate the collateral damage.
Furthermore, the attacker, from which we generate the malicious
traffic (via replaying a pcap file like in [19]), is also cast to Server 2
in a second VM4. The attack traffic, furthermore, contained the des-
tination IP address of A1. (This setup gives a conservative estimate
of the damage done; a single large "victim" flow can be handled
in TSS using only a single cache entry "ideally", while real work-
loads usually include thousands of flows requiring hundreds of
TSS entries that will compete with the attacker’s adversarial cache
entries.). The OVS flow table was bootstrapped manually according
to the ACL in Fig. 6.
Next, we show to what extent the throughput of OVS is affected
as the number of MFC masks increases; we also evaluate the effect
of several NIC driver offloading techniques.
The results when the victim generates TCP and UDP traffic
are depicted in Fig. 9a, where the x axis shows the number of
MFC masks, while the y axis plots the corresponding throughput;
note that both axes are in log scale. In order to easily realize the
maximum number of MFC entries attainable in each use case, we
note the x tick labels for numbers 17, 260, 516 and 8200 by Dp,
SpDp, SipDp, and SipSpDp, respectively. We observed dramatically
different effects depending on various settings of the NIC driver. In
particular, jumbo frames and generic transmit/receive offload support
(GRO ON) let the NIC to assemble many small TCP packets into a
3Even though benign traffic may consist of other types of flows (e.g., short-lived), they
are out of scope of this study.
4Note, however, that in real deployments the attack might cannot be launched com-
pletely within a DC due to the IP spoofing protection mechanism of the CMS (e.g.,
OpenStack) that prevents attacks based on this header field.
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(c) Kubernetes results for the SipSpDp scenario.
Figure 8: Results for synthetic (a), OpenStack (b) and Kubernetes (c) scenarios, respectively
single large TCP buffer [59], reducing the effective traffic rate seen
by OVS to a couple of thousand pps which it can process efficiently
even when the TSS classifier has excess masks. Furthermore, we
also enabled full hardware offloading (FHO ON) via our Mellanox
CX-4 NIC, which gave a huge boost to the overall performance
(∼ 30 Gbps). However, the TSS classifier still remains vulnerable
resulting in a significant performance drop as the number of MFC
masks increases above 200. For UDP, these settings take no effect
and performance degradation is clearly visible in all scenarios.
Our observations are as follows: i) 17 masks (max. in Dp use
case) are sufficient to reduce the effective throughput to roughly
97%, 88%, and 53% of the Baseline with GRO ON, FHO ON, and
GRO OFF, respectively. As the ii) number of masks reaches 260
(max. in SpDp), these numbers are as follows: 95%, 43%, and 10%,
respectively. In case of having iii) more than 500 masks in the MFC
(e.g., in SipDp), the increased packet classification time reduces
the full capacity to its 76%, 29%, and 4.7%, respectively. Finally, iv)
spawning more than 8000 masks (attainable in case of SipSpDp)
result in virtually a complete denial of service attack in each case
as the throughput drops down to 3.9%, 2.1%, and 0.2%, respectively.
Hereafter, we present only the results for TCP with GRO OFF.
To present the increased packet processing time, the secondary
y axis shows the flow completion time of 1GB TCP traffic with
GRO OFF as the number of MFC masks grows; again, note the log
scale. It can be seen that, on average, the flow completion time only
increases half as high as the number of MFC masks.
Nevertheless, this experiment clearly marks the vulnerability of
TSS to low-bandwidth DoS attacks.
Next, Fig. 8a gives the results for 3 parallel victim TCP flow in the
SipDp scenario with TCP offloading disabled. In this benchmark, the
attacker is active from t1 until t2 injecting 100 packets per second
(50 Kbps), reducing victims’ aggregate traffic rate from 9.7 Gbps
to below 0.5 Gbps. Observe the delay in the recovery of the victim
rate that returns to full rate only after 10 seconds after t2; this is
due to the 10 sec idle MFC timeout in OVS, keeping the attacker’s
entries alive for an extended time.
The extent and type of the damage varies on a case by case basis,
depending on the type of ACLs injected, the OVS version, the NIC
configuration, etc. For instance, when we apply the SipDp attack
vector over IPv6 we find that OVS applies the “wildcarding” TSS
entry generation technique only to the TCP destination port field
but seems to handle the IPv6 source address using exact match-
ing, which can result in only a handful of masks but hundreds
of thousands of MFC entries (irrespectively of the TSE method).
Hence, in this scenario the adversarial effect manifests itself not
in the slowdown of the victim traffic but rather in excess memory
and CPU consumption, with OVS taking up 8 CPU cores trying to
uselessly reclaim megaflow memory occupied by the excess TSS
entries. Restricting OVS to just 2 CPU cores then reduces victim
traffic to 5% of its nominal rate.
Next, we evaluate the Co-located TSE attack in two smaller real
testbeds (in-house for ethical concerns): OpenStack and Kubernetes.
5.5 OpenStack
Our OpenStack testbed (cf. Table 1 for details) uses the OVN integra-
tion [72]; this configuration is known to exhibit superior network
performance compared to the default [4]. Workload isolation be-
tween the attacker and the victim was enforced by deploying the
corresponding VMs using different OpenStack tenants.
The CMS API only allows the SipDp scenario, for which the
results are given in Fig.8b; here, the attacker starts sending at the
beginning of the benchmark at 100 pps and stops in the 60-th second
only to restart 30 seconds later; the victim joins with a full-rate
UDP iperf session at the 30-th second. In line with the synthetic
setup, in the OpenStack testbed we again see a substantial (more than
90%) useful performance reduction during the time interval when both
the attacker and the victim are active. Again, the victim recovers 10
seconds after the attacker stops sending. Curiously, the re-activation
of the attacker causes only a minor damage to the victim rate (about
10% drop); it seems that the attack is effective only against newly
established target flows but causes minor harm to long-lasting flows
already active at the moment when the attack starts. We observed
this behavior consistently in this version of OpenStack; we have
contacted the OVS authors regarding this behavior of this specific
unstable version of OVS, but the reasons were mostly unknown
and migrating to a stable version was suggested.
5.6 Kubernetes
Our setup uses the OVN integration [68] and the topology is the
same as in the synthetic tests; one server hosts the attacker and the
victim source and another hosts the sinks, both provisioned in sepa-
rate vagrant boxes connected by a virtio network link supporting 1
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Gbps rate. Here, we could use the SipSpDp attack scenario yielding
the full ACL in Fig. 6; since Kubernetes/OVN currently does not
support the full semantics of Calico network policies we injected
the source port filtering rules manually via the CLI.
The results are shown in Fig. 8c. Initially no “malicious” ACL
is set up, i.e., when the victim starts an iperf session it quickly
reaches 1Gpbs rate. The attacker starts sending at t1 at 1, 000 pps
(causing a minor glitch in the victim rate) and then injects the ACL
in Fig. 6 at t2, triggering thousands of MFC entries in the OVS data
plane. In response, the victim rate rapidly drops by 80%. Then, at
t4, the attacker increases its sending rate to 2, 000 pps, resulting in
a full denial of network service to the victim. From that point, the
victim rate drops close to 0 for 30 seconds, during which OVS can
hardly push any useful packets through the data plane because of
the malicious activity of the attacker. During our evaluations, we
have seen similar cases of full-blown DoS under various scenarios,
with cases when iperf could not even establish a new TCP session
for extended periods of time.
6 GENERAL TSE
Next, we scrutinize the efficiency of the TSE attack when having co-
located resources and knowledge about the ACLs are not required.
Such alleviated requirements make General TSE attack more appeal-
ing as any arbitrary service, i.e., ACL, can be attacked. However,
this comfort comes at a price that the attack itself requires more
effort (in terms of packet rate) to even approximate the efficiency
of Co-located TSE yet keeping the attack rate low (≪ volumetric).
Correspondingly, in this section we first discuss how to generate
a packet trace against an unknown ACL. Then, we show lower
bounds on the estimated number of MFC masks we can achieve in
all use cases against the ACL in Fig. 6), which we underpin later
with practical measurements.
6.1 Adversarial Packet Trace
To target an unknown ACL, a naïve approach would generate se-
quentially all possible packets for the given header fields in order
to spawn as many MFC masks as possible. Clearly, such approach
would easily result in a volumetric attack since considering even
the case of SipDp, the required successful attack rate would be
∼ 2.9 p(eta)bps. Therefore, we need a better heuristic algorithm
that tries to approximate the attainable number of MFC masks.
Randomization has proven to be efficient many times in practice
(e.g., evolutionary and genetic algorithms, runtime analysis, con-
vergence [9]), thus we adapt this approach to our packet trace
generation. First, we analyse what are the chances that a packet
with random (but legitimate) header will spawn an MFC entry.
Then, we show what is the expected number of MFC masks for a
given number of random packets sent to an unknown ACL.
Single Header. One can see in Fig. 3 that for a header length h the
probability that one packet will spawn a specific entry in the MFC
is pk (MFC) = 2
k
2h , where k is the number of wildcarded bits the
given MFC entry has; e.g., #2 entry in Fig. 3 p2(MFC) = 2223 = 0.5.
Generally, the probability that from n randomly generated packets
there will be at least 1 packet that sparks an MFC entry for a given
k is:
p(k ,n)(MFC) = 1 − (1 − pk (MFC))n . (1)
Accordingly, the expected value of the number of MFC masks can
be formalized as follows:
E(k ,n)(MFC) =
h∑
k=0
Ck ∗ p(k ,n)(MFC), (2)
where Ck notes the number of different MFC entries for a given k .
Multiple Headers. Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 can be generalized to multiple
headers; one only needs to pay attention to the number of possible
different MFC mask combinations (Ck ) for a given k , which heavily
depends on the width of the header the first flow rule matches on
(see Appendix for more details).
Note that for each use case all related header fields were random-
ized (e.g., for SipDp the packet trace contained packets with random
source IP and destination port). Similarly to Co-located TSE, the
traces included additional random noise to exhaust the microflow
cache. Recall, it is usually used up in normal operation.
6.2 Synthetic Tests
Next, we show to what extent a practical random packet trace
generation is in par with the expected values above.
Note that in our evaluation we used the same ACLs as well as the
same testbed presented in §5, however, the attacker targets the ACL
installed by the victim (ACL-V). For brevity, we only present the
results for the synthetic tests, but note that as long as the General
TSE attack achieves the same amount of MFC masks as Co-located
TSE, the effects are the same irrespectively to the environment.
Results are depicted in Fig. 9b, where on the x axis the number
of different random packets is shown, while the y axis depicts
the expected (E) and measured (M) (averaged over 100 runs) MFC
masks for each use case. Since the expected values are dominated
by the width of the header the first flow rule of the ACL matches
on (cf. §6.1), the difference between SipDp and SpDp was negligible;
hence the latter is removed for brevity.
Observe that the more different header fields the ACL consists
of the more MFC entries can be spawned with the same number of
random packets. In particular, the maximum attainable MFC masks
(with 50, 000 packets) are approx. 16, 121, 122, and 581 in case of
Dp, SpDp, SipDp, and SipSpDp, respectively. In terms of service
degradation, these results mean that General TSE can reduce the
full capacity with GRO OFF to 52% (97% with GRO ON, 88% with
FHO, 60% with UDP), 12% (96% with GRO ON, 87% with FHO, 15.8%
with UDP), and 1% (73.5% with GRO ON, 25.5% with FHO, 3.25%
with UDP), respectively.
Recall that inCo-located TSE themaximum attainableMFCmasks
(17 for Dp, 256 for SpDp, 512 for SipDp, and 8195 for SipSpDp,
respectively) require the same amount of packets. This means that
for the Dp use case, General TSE can be as good as Co-located TSE in
terms of attainable MFC masks. As Co-located TSE requires roughly
1, 000 packets (0.67Mbps) do tear down OVS in the most complex
use case, it can be seen that the same amount of random packets
in case of General TSE is sufficient to degrade the useful capacity
to 72.8% with GRO OFF (99.15% with GRO ON, 91.25% with FHO,
77.28% with UDP), 25.4% with GRO OFF (96.8% with GRO ON,
87.95% with FHO, 32.35% with UDP), and 11.7% with GRO OFF
(95.8% with GRO ON, 87% with FHO, 12.5% with UDP) for Dp,
SpDp/SipDp, and SipSpDp, respectively.
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7 DISCUSSION
The technique extends to an arbitrary number of protocol fields. Each
CMS imposes its own set of limitations on the possible ACLs that
can be installed and the extent to which different packet header
fields can be considered: by default, OpenStack and Kubernetes
allow ingress policies to filter only on the source IP addresses and
the destination port (TCP or UDP) [15, 70]. This gives a comfortable
32∗16 = 512 excessmasks in theMFC. Calico (a Kubernetes network
plugin [65]) allows ingress security policies to also filter on the
source port, yielding possibly 8192 masks (already enough for a
full-blown DoS) to which egress policies introduce the destination
IP address as well (∼ 200 thousand masks).
All cloud deployments implementing ACLs in OVS are affected. OVS
is extensively used in cloud-based systems (e.g., it is the most widely
used hypervisor switch in OpenStack) and it increasingly takes
over the responsibility of enforcing ACLs from iptables due to
the raw performance edge, standard support, and ease in man-
agement [56]. The TSE attack is effective over the OVN backend
for OpenStack Neutron [72], OpenStack/OpenDaylight [69], Open-
Stack/ONOS [67], and in Kubernetes/OVN as demonstrated in §5.5
and §5.6. Note, however, that default installations are not directly
affected as ACLs are implemented in iptables, but this architec-
ture tends to become legacy soon [4]. Furthermore, major cloud
providers do not seem to be affected: for instance, Microsoft Azure
does not use OVS in the AccelNet network virtualization frame-
work [28] and, even though the Google Cloud Platform does include
OVS in the Andromeda data plane, this seems to be a significantly
stripped down version [21]. In any case, we did not perform specific
tests in public cloud providers’ DCs for obvious ethical reasons.
TSE generalizes beyond OVS. TSE exploits an algorithmic complex-
ity deficiency in the venerable TSS scheme. Therefore, deployments
relying on the TSS scheme for packet classification, e.g., Open-
Stack/Networking-vpp [71], Contiv/VPP Kubernetes [25], Xen/
HyperSwitch [59], Netronome SmartNIC [49], might be also af-
fected; the evaluation has bee left for a future study.
Furthermore, there is considerable base of network-function vir-
tualization [33, 48], cloud gateway/load-balancer [48], campus and
enterprise networks [47] that use TSS scheme for packet classifier
to implement non-trivial packet processing pipelines. If any of the
flow tables in these deployments contain the above adversarial
pattern, then the DoS attacks presented here are effective.
8 MITIGATION
The above results suggest that TSE can be particularly damag-
ing. Accordingly, we initiated a responsible disclosure process by
providing code and methodology to reproduce the synthetic tests
to the corresponding security teams [11, 17, 18]. Besides, several
immediate yet impractical remedies might help: (i) deploying or
offloading ACL implementations to a different hypervisor switch
(e.g., [34, 48, 78]) or to the (ii) high-performing gateway appliance
(e.g., [6]), (iii) switching the MFC completely off, or (iv) enabling ad-
vanced flow caching via DPDK-based OVS datapath [23]. However,
each of the above has the following corresponding disadvantage: in
case of (i) other implementations might suffer from the same attack
(e.g., [25, 26, 74]) or (ii) they do not help against attacks initiated
within the DC, for (iii) MFC has been the biggest performance im-
provement so far [55], and for (iv) the feature that may prevent the
attack is available in select datapaths.
Forcing the use of jumbo frames and TCP buffers (cf. §5.4) can
substantially decrease the effective packet rate, however packets
coming from outside might be limited to the default MTU size. And
they do not cover attack against other traffic; e.g., UDP, which is
the underlying transport protocol in QUIC [66].
MFCGuard. As a more customized mitigation technique we de-
veloped MFCGuard, which monitors and modifies the MFC—if the
number of masks exceed a certain threshold, it looks for patterns
corresponding to a possible TSE attack (cf. §3) in every 10 seconds,
and wipes out those entries accordingly. We observed that monitor-
ing (and modifying) the MFC has no overhead on the performance.
In essence, removing an entry from the MFC means that matching
packets will be processed in the slow path again. Since the slow
path would spark the same MFC entries again, the idea behind
MFCGuard was to constantly keep those entries out of the fast path.
In practice, however, we observed that once anMFC entry is deleted
then it will never be sparked again, i.e., matching packets will al-
ways be processed by the slow path. Such undesired, unexpected
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and undocumented behavior [12] can have serious performance
penalties; although MFC entries can be manually re-injected.
There are several requirements MFCGuard needs to meet: (i) en-
tries covering the useful traffic should never be deleted. Further-
more, (ii) according to the available resources, we can only remove
select flows from the MFC to find a balance between the maximum
performance of the fast path and the increased resource utilization
by the slow path; both impacting the overall quality of the run
services. Due to requirement (i) MFCGuard will only remove entries
with drop action! With this simple yet important requirement, only
adversarial packets will be subjected to the slow path, keeping the
fast path accelerated for the useful traffic flows (cf. Alg. 2 in §11.4).
In our current implementation, we have therefore focused on (i),
leaving (ii) for future work.
We evaluated the efficiency of MFCGuard in all use cases (by
deleting all drop rules) and observed that once the MFC is “cleaned”,
the performance of the victim’s traffic goes back to its baseline. As
the slow path is becoming much more involved, we evaluated the
system’s load in such cases. Results are depicted in Fig. 9c, where x
and y axes show the attack rate and the corresponding CPU usage
of the slow path daemon (ovs-vswitchd), respectively.
It can be seen that as long as the attack rate is less than 1, 000 pps
(< 1Mbps) the slow path only consumes 15% of the CPU; recall, this
packet rate is enough to bring down OVS in case of Co-located TSE).
However, when the packet rate is 10, 000 pps, the CPU load jumps
up to ≈ 80% (this rate in case of General TSE would be enough
to degrade the full capacity to 10%). We can conclude that our
current MFCGuard implementation is already capable of efficiently
mitigating both TSE attacks as long as the attacking rate is low.
If the attack rate is much above 10, 000 pps, the attack becomes a
volumetric attack, for which there are multiple solutions to detect
and handle (e.g., excess amount of packets and over-provisioning).
9 RELATEDWORK
Whether or not to virtualize services is a complicated questionmany
enterprises are facing today [24]; in a survey, 73% of responders
said that security is a top challenge holding back cloud adoption
[62], with the possibility of unmediated sharing and communica-
tions between different tenants’ workloads being among the major
concerns [53]. Such unmediated tenant-to-tenant interaction might
be initiated by a malicious user by first launching a co-residency
attack in order to co-locate a virtual machine with the target ten-
ants’ virtual machines on the same physical server [75], and then
exploiting a side-channel effect [40, 44] to eavesdrop on sensitive
information [22, 60].
Direct attacks on the cloud network infrastructure are less
known; there has been work on fuzzing the data plane with con-
siderable success [51, 73] and compromising SDN controllers [7].
Denial of service using algorithmic complexity attacks [2, 14, 16, 54]
on the network data plane usually works by exploiting a vulnerable
algorithm/data structure that is already in the targeted binary; e.g.,
[77] shows cache-collision attacks against the Linux IP stack and
[20] targets stateful firewalls. Here, we showed a vulnerable data
structure in the TSS scheme heavily used for packet classification
in hypervisor switches. We showed that a typical ACL can be the
vulnerable target itself in the data plane. Our finding can be ex-
ploited either remotely from the public Internet, or leasing a single
virtual machine deployed in the cloud; detection and prevention
techniques for algorithmic complexity attacks (see e.g., [5, 38, 54])
do not seem effective against it. Although, a mitigation technique
for an algorithmic complexity attack in DPI engines [3] uses similar
approach as our MFCGuard: a devised algorithm is used, which has a
constant (but less than normal) throughput regardless of the input.
The authors’ aim is to dynamically shift between algorithms for
normal and malicious input. In contrast, MFCGuard does not need to
change algorithms at all, and always provides the highest attainable
throughput regardless of the low-rate input.
10 CONCLUSION
Highly efficient and resilient packet classification is crucial to many
security primitives particularly in a virtualized environments. In
this paper, we investigate to what extent the TSS algorithm used in
many software switches is vulnerable against low-rate DoS attacks.
Our TSE attack exploits the fundamental space/time complexity of
the TSS algorithm, and degrades the switch performance to 12%
with low attack rate (0.7 Mbps). We show that if an adversary has
knowledge of the used classification policies, she can virtually bring
down the packet classifier with the same attack rate. One key aspect
of our TSE attack is that it is hard to detect the attack as it does
not uses any specific traffic pattern but some random packets. Fur-
thermore, since we exploit a vital complexity characteristic, there
seems to be no complete mitigation technique, unfortunately. As a
short-term solution, we propose MFCGuard, a monitoring system
that via carefully managing the entries in the tuple space can keep
packet classification fast.
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11 APPENDIX
11.1 OVS cache infrastructure
The OVS flow cache infrastructure and the whole pipeline of pro-
cessing a packet through the caches all the way up to the slow path
(in case of the first packet of the flow) is shown in Fig. 10.
Figure 10: The OVS flow cache infrastructure.
11.2 Megaflow Lookup Algorithm
With the invariants (Inv(1)) and (Inv(2)) described in §3.2 is mind
we summarize a rather simplified description of the MFC lookup
algorithm implemented in the OVS fast path below:
Algorithm 1Megaflow lookup. Input: packet header h
forM ∈ M do
lookup (h AND M) in the hash HM
if found then return cache hit
end for
return cache miss
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let parameter k = |M| denote the
number of masks and let Bi be the set of bitpositions used by the
i-th mask. It is easy to see that the number of keys in the MFC is
minimal if Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k . In this case, to cover each
denied packet the i-th mask needs 2bi − 1 keys (each key except
the one that refers to the allow rule), where bi is the number of
bit positions set in Bi . Thus, the number of keys in the MFC is∑
i
(
2ki − 1
)
. Using the inequality between geometric and arith-
metic means, the expression
∑
i 2bi subject to
∑
i bi = w takes the
minimal value when k2
w
k . Hence, for k masks the number of keys
is at least k2
w
k − k = O(k2wk ). □
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We focus only on the keys that refer to
deny packets. Since there is an allow rule for each field, all masks
must refer to every field on at least one position. One can see that to
minimize the number of keys these positions should be a Cartesian
product of separate solutions for the different fields. Let ki be the
number of masks considering only the i-th field, then using the
result of Theorem 4.1 we get the required result. □
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11.3 Probabilities and expected values
Multiple header fields with ACL unknown. Naïvely, one might think
that for each k there is one combination where one of the headers
has k − l wildcarded bits, while the other header has l (0 ≤ l ≤ k).
However, as can be seen in Fig. 5 according to the order of the flow
rules in the flow table (cf. Fig. 4), only the first allow rule appears
in the MFC cache in the same way, i.e., with the other header fully
wildcarded. If the second flow rule was also represented in the same
way, then the MFC would violate the order-independent property
as a packet with HYP 001 and HYP2 1111 header would match on
both of the entries. Therefore, for k = l or k = 0 there is just one
combination.
Furthermore, if k is greater than the length of the shortest header
(s), then again the number of possible combinations is less (i.e., it
simply cannot hold more wildcarded bits as its length s). These
observations can be summarized as follows: for two different header
fields of length s, l (s ≤ l) : Ck = k + 2 if 0 ≤ k < s , Ck = s if
s ≤ k < l , and Ck = (s + l) − (k + 1) if l ≤ k .
Thus, the most important factor in calculating of the expected
values isCk . In the following, how its calculation can be generalized
to above 2 headers.
Assume that we havem + 1 different flow rules, wherem rules
match onm different headers with sizes of h1,h2, . . . ,hm , where h1
is the highest priority rule, while hm is the lowest one. Additionally,
the last rule ((m + 1)th ) is the low priority deny rule. The entries
covering the i−1th rule contain prefix rules for the previous headers,
exact match for the ith header, and wildcard for the remaining
headers. Let fi−1(u) be the number of combinations for prefix fields
with u wildcarded bit. Then, it can be calculated by the following
convolution:
fi (k) =
min(k ,hj )∑
j=1
fi−1(k − j),
where f0(k) = 1k=0. Let fm be the same for the deny rule, and it can
calculated with the same convolution. Furthermore, letC(i−1)k be the
number of combinations that contain k wildcarded bits in the whole
header, then it can be calculated as C(i−1)k = fi−1(k −
∑m
j=i+1 hj ).
Therefore, Ck =
∑m
i=0C
(i)
k .
11.4 Mitigation Algorithm
Below, we present the mitigation algorithm. First, it has two preset
thresholds (for the number of MFC masks (m_th) as well as for
the acceptable CPU overhead (c_th)) as input parameters that can
be fine-tuned according to the available resources. As indicated in
Line 1, the algorithm runs every 10 seconds according to the MFC
eviction policy. In Line 2, we check the number of masks in the
MFC (it can be acquired via commands ovs-dpctl dump-flows or
ovs-dpctl show). If the number of MFC masks is above the preset
threshold (Line 3), then for each rule in the FlowTable we look for
a pattern the TSE attack would generate (according to §4) in the
MFC (Line 4). If a pattern is found (Line 6), we remove the corre-
sponding entries from the MFC (Line 7 ). Each time after removing
some selected entries from the MFC, we check the increased CPU
utilization (e.g., via command top in Line 9) and if it is below the
threshold (Line 10), we keep removing MFC entries (if there are
Algorithm 2Mitigation. Input: #MFC mask threshold m_th, CPU
utilization threshold c_th
1: for every 10 second do
2: m ← checkNumberOfMasks()
3: if m > m_th then
4: for rule in FlowTable do
5: f ound ← lookPatternInMFC(rule)
6: if f ound then
7: deleteMFCEntries(rule)
8: end if
9: cpu_util ← checkCPUUtilization()
10: if cpu_util ≥ c_th then
11: return
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end for
any); otherwise the system is considered to be balanced, i.e., no
more entries from the MFC will be removed as it would cause too
much packet processing overhead in the slow path.
